Evolutionary psychology’s moral implicationsJohn Cartwright, Evolution and Human Behavior: Darwinian Perspectives on Human Nature. 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008

被引:0
作者
Matthew C. Braddock
机构
[1] Duke University,Department of Philosophy
关键词
Evolutionary psychology; Sociobiology; Darwinism; Genetic determinism; Free-will; Moral responsibility; Compatibilism;
D O I
10.1007/s10539-008-9136-8
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it give us reason to think that we may have to change our ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects.
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页码:531 / 540
页数:9
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]  
Downes SM(2001)Some recent developments in evolutionary approaches to the study of human cognition and behavior Biol Philos 16 575-595
[2]  
Lewens T(2003)Prospects for evolutionary policy Philosophy 78 495-514