Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation

被引:0
作者
Robert Northcott
机构
[1] University of London,Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College
来源
Synthese | 2021年 / 198卷
关键词
Causation; Counterfactuals; Pre-emption; Experiments; Psychology; Error theory;
D O I
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学科分类号
摘要
Pre-emption cases have been taken by almost everyone to imply the unviability of the simple counterfactual theory of causation. Yet there is ample motivation from scientific practice to endorse a simple version of the theory if we can. There is a way in which a simple counterfactual theory, at least if understood contrastively, can be supported even while acknowledging that intuition goes firmly against it in pre-emption cases—or rather, only in some of those cases. For I present several new pre-emption cases in which causal intuition does not go against the counterfactual theory, a fact that has been verified experimentally. I suggest an account of framing effects that can square the circle. Crucially, this account offers hope of theoretical salvation—but only to the counterfactual theory of causation, not to others. Again, there is (admittedly only preliminary) experimental support for this account.
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页码:537 / 555
页数:18
相关论文
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