Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble

被引:0
作者
Ross P. Cameron
机构
[1] University of Leeds,Department of Philosophy
来源
Philosophical Studies | 2008年 / 140卷
关键词
Ontological Commitment; Fundamentality; Metaontology; Composition; Neo-Fregeanism;
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学科分类号
摘要
What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.
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页码:1 / 18
页数:17
相关论文
共 11 条
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