Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble

被引：0

作者：

Ross P. Cameron

机构：

[1] University of Leeds,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Philosophical Studies | 2008年 / 140卷

关键词：

Ontological Commitment; Fundamentality; Metaontology; Composition; Neo-Fregeanism;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

What are the ontological commitments of a sentence? In this paper I offer an answer from the perspective of the truthmaker theorist that contrasts with the familiar Quinean criterion. I detail some of the benefits of thinking of things this way: they include making the composition debate tractable without appealing to a neo-Carnapian metaontology, making sense of neo-Fregeanism, and dispensing with some otherwise recalcitrant necessary connections.

引用

页码：1 / 18

页数：17

共 11 条

[1]

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[2]

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[3]

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[4]

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[5]

Cameron R. P.(2008)Truthmakers and necessary connections. Synthese 161 27-45

[6]

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[7]

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[8]

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[9]

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[10]

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