Alienation, Resonance, and Experience in Theories of Well-Being

被引:0
作者
Andrew Alwood
机构
[1] University of Richmond,Department of Economics, Robins School of Business
来源
Philosophia | 2023年 / 51卷
关键词
Well-Being; Alienation; Resonance; Objective Theories of Value; Subjective Theories of Value;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Each person has a special relation to his or her own well-being. This rough thought, which can be sharpened in different ways, is supposed to substantially count against objectivist theories on which one can intrinsically benefit from, or be harmed by, factors that are independent of one’s desires, beliefs, and other attitudes. It is often claimed, contra objectivism, that one cannot be alienated from one’s own interests, or that improvements in a person’s well-being must resonate with that person. However, I argue that every theory of well-being must allow that we can be alienated from our own well-being, and that sophisticated objectivists can accept and make use of a resonance constraint against their opponents.
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页码:2225 / 2240
页数:15
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