Moore’s Paradox for God

被引：0

作者：

John N. Williams

机构：

[1] Charles Darwin University,School of Creative Arts and Humanities

来源：

Philosophia | 2019年 / 47卷

关键词：

Omniscience; Rationality; Self-reference; Moore’s paradox;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate and rebut three objections to my argument.

引用

页码：265 / 270

页数：5

共 8 条

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[8]

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