A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

被引：0
作者：
Emiliya Lazarova
Peter Borm
Maria Montero
Hans Reijnierse
机构：
[1] Queen’s University Belfast,Queen’s Management School
[2] Tilburg University,Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
[3] University of Nottingham,School of Economics
来源：
TOP | 2011年 / 19卷
关键词：
Bargaining set; Endogenous coalition formation; Internal and external stability; 91A12;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows one to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.
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页码：54 / 66
页数：12
相关论文
共 3 条
  • [1] Morelli M(2003)The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to weighted majority games Games Econ Behav 42 137-155
  • [2] Montero M(1994)A new bargaining set of an Games Econ Behav 6 512-526
  • [3] Zhou L(undefined)-person game and endogenous coalition formation undefined undefined undefined-undefined
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