On symmetric stochastic games of resource extraction with weakly continuous transitions

被引:0
作者
Anna Jaśkiewicz
Andrzej S. Nowak
机构
[1] Wrocław University of Science and Technology,Faculty of Pure and Applied Mathematics
[2] University of Zielona Góra,Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Science and Econometrics
来源
TOP | 2018年 / 26卷
关键词
Stochastic game; Resource extraction game; Stationary Markov perfect equilibrium; Weakly continuous transition probability; 91A15; 91A25; 91A50; 91B62;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We study stochastic games of resource extraction, in which the players have identical preferences. The transition probability is either non-atomic or a convex combination of transition probabilities depending on the investment with coefficients also dependent on the investment. Our approach covers the unbounded utility case, which was not examined in this class of games beforehand. We prove the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in a non-randomised class of strategies.
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页码:239 / 256
页数:17
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