Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil

被引：13
作者：
Schiehll E. [1 ]
Terra P.R.S. [2 ]
Victor F.G. [2 ]
机构：
[1] HEC-Montréal, Montréal, QC, H3T 2A7, 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine
[2] Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, 90010-460
来源：
Journal of Management & Governance | 2013年 / 17卷 / 2期
关键词：
Brazil; Emerging markets; Executive compensation; Stock options; Voluntary disclosure;
D O I：
10.1007/s10997-011-9179-0
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are significantly related to the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also show that family-controlled companies in Brazil are associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Results are robust to a number of specification tests, dependent and explanatory variable measurements, and sample composition. This study has professional and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets. The results underscore the need for stricter rules for executive compensation reporting in Brazil, and they invite policy makers and regulators in emerging markets to consider the effects of company-level governance factors on disclosure incentives. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
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页码：331 / 361
页数：30
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