Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods

被引：0

作者：

N. M. Galieva

A. V. Korolev

G. A. Ougolnitsky

机构：

[1] St. Petersburg Branch of the Higher School of Economics,

[2] Southern Federal University,undefined

来源：

Dynamic Games and Applications | 2024年 / 14卷

关键词：

Differential games; Difference games; Hierarchical control; Network models; Resource allocation;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The discrete- and continuous-time network models of opinions control and resource allocation in marketing are considered. Three cases of interaction of economic agents are studied: independent behavior, cooperation, and hierarchical control by the resource-owning Principal. The corresponding dynamic games are analytically solved. The agents’ payoffs in these cases are compared. Two concepts, “enough resources” and “a lack of resources,” are introduced and investigated. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.

引用

页码：362 / 395

页数：33