The role of context in contextualism

被引：0
作者：
Martin Montminy
机构：
[1] University of Oklahoma,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Synthese | 2013年 / 190卷
关键词：
Contextualism; Knowledge; Context; Intentions; Truth conditions;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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页码：2341 / 2366
页数：25
相关论文
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