Short- and long-term participation tax rates and their impact on labor supply

被引：0

作者：

Charlotte Bartels

Nico Pestel

机构：

[1] German Institute for Economic Research (DIW),

[2] Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies (UCFS),undefined

[3] Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),undefined

[4] University of Cologne,undefined

[5] Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW),undefined

来源：

International Tax and Public Finance | 2016年 / 23卷

关键词：

Labor force participation; Work incentives; Welfare; Unemployment insurance; Income taxation; H24; H31; J22; J65;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Generous income support programs as provided by European welfare states have often been blamed to hamper employment. This paper investigates the importance of incentives inherent in the tax-benefit system for the individual decision to take up work. Using German microdata over the period 1993–2010, we find that recent reforms in Germany increased work incentives at the extensive margin measured by the participation tax rate (PTR), particularly for low-income individuals. Work incentives are even higher if the time horizon is extended to more than one year, pointing at an overestimation of the disincentives by standard measures. Regression analysis reveals that a decrease in the PTR increases the probability of taking up work significantly.

引用

页码：1126 / 1159

页数：33