What Drives Clarity of Central Bank Communication About Inflation?

被引:0
|
作者
Aleš Bulíř
Martin Čihák
David-Jan Jansen
机构
[1] International Monetary Fund,Institute for Capacity Development
[2] International Monetary Fund,Monetary and Capital Markets Department
[3] De Nederlandsche Bank,Economics and Research Division
来源
Open Economies Review | 2013年 / 24卷
关键词
Monetary policy; Communication; Inflation; Clarity; Transparency; E52; E58;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper examines whether the clarity of central bank communication about inflation varies with the economic environment. Using readability statistics and content analysis, we study the clarity of communication on the inflation outlook by seven central banks across three continents during the recent decade. We uncover significant and persistent differences in clarity over time and across countries. However, identifying determinants of clarity that are robustly relevant across our sample of central banks proves elusive. Overall, our findings suggest that a single model for clarity of central bank communication is not appropriate. Rather, when studying clarity of communication, country-specific and institution-specific factors are highly relevant.
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页码:125 / 145
页数:20
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