Central Bank independence revisited

被引：0
作者：
Mersch Y. [1 ]
机构：
来源：
ERA Forum | 2018年 / 18卷 / 4期
关键词：
Central Banks; ECB; Financial crisis; Independence; Supervision;
D O I：
10.1007/s12027-018-0491-x
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The paper examines the degree and extent of independence which the European Central Bank is granted by the primary and secondary law in its different roles as guarantor of price stability, as crisis manager and as financial market supervisor. © 2018, ERA.
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页码：627 / 645
页数：18
相关论文
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