The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer

被引:0
作者
Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Ruth M. J. Byrne
Vittorio Girotto
机构
[1] Princeton University,Department of Psychology
[2] School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience,undefined
[3] Trinity College Dublin,undefined
[4] University IUAV Venice,undefined
来源
Topoi | 2009年 / 28卷
关键词
Human reasoning; Conditionals; Mental models; Probabilistic reasoning;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper replies to Politzer’s (2007) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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页码:75 / 80
页数:5
相关论文
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