Third-party signals in equity crowdfunding: the role of prior financing

被引:127
作者
Kleinert, Simon [1 ]
Volkmann, Christine [1 ]
Gruenhagen, Marc [1 ]
机构
[1] Berg Univ Wuppertal, Gaussstr 20, D-42119 Wuppertal, Germany
关键词
Entrepreneurial finance; Securities issuance; Equity crowdfunding; Signaling theory; Certification; INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS; VENTURE CAPITALISTS; INVESTMENT DECISIONS; SUCCESS; MARKET; CROWD; PERFORMANCE; ENTREPRENEURS; CERTIFICATION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1007/s11187-018-0125-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Drawing on signaling theory, this study provides preliminary evidence that prior financing certifies firm quality to investors and reduces information asymmetries in equity crowdfunding. We examine 221 business plans and project descriptions of start-ups that ran equity crowdfunding campaigns on Crowdcube in 2017 and 2018. Almost half of the start-ups had previously raised funds through business angels, venture capitalists, crowdfunding, or grants. Prior financing positively affects campaign success. Overall, the effect is larger for firms backed by multiple investor types and for firms that have run successful crowdfunding before. To isolate the quality signal from the additional benefits related to an affiliation with other investors, we analyze whether the effect of prior financing is moderated by the uncertainty around a project. In support of a signaling effect, preliminary evidence suggests that prior financing is most relevant for firms in the uncertain seed stage. Among the different investor types, we find that, in particular, an affiliation with venture capitalists signals quality. Such an affiliation is more important for firms with low levels of human and social capital. Our study adds to the understanding of how equity crowdfunding interacts with traditional forms of entrepreneurial finance.
引用
收藏
页码:341 / 365
页数:25
相关论文
共 103 条
[1]   Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding [J].
Ahlers, Gerrit K. C. ;
Cumming, Douglas ;
Guenther, Christina ;
Schweizer, Denis .
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, 2015, 39 (04) :955-980
[2]   MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].
AKERLOF, GA .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1970, 84 (03) :488-500
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2014, Innovation Policy Econom., DOI DOI 10.1086/674021
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2000, VENTUR CAP, DOI DOI 10.1080/136910600295729
[5]   Financial signaling by innovative nascent ventures: The relevance of patents and prototypes [J].
Audretsch, David B. ;
Boente, Werner ;
Mahagaonkar, Prashanth .
RESEARCH POLICY, 2012, 41 (08) :1407-1421
[6]   Picking winners or building them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups [J].
Baum, JAC ;
Silverman, BS .
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING, 2004, 19 (03) :411-436
[7]   INVESTMENT BANKING, REPUTATION, AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS [J].
BEATTY, RP ;
RITTER, JR .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1986, 15 (1-2) :213-232
[8]   Signalling Theory and Equilibrium in Strategic Management Research: An Assessment and a Research Agenda [J].
Bergh, Donald D. ;
Connelly, Brian L. ;
Ketchen, David J., Jr. ;
Shannon, Lu M. .
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 2014, 51 (08) :1334-1360
[9]   Venture capital financing and the growth of high-tech start-ups: Disentangling treatment from selection effects [J].
Bertoni, Fabio ;
Colombo, Massimo G. ;
Grilli, Luca .
RESEARCH POLICY, 2011, 40 (07) :1028-1043
[10]   Which updates during an equity crowdfunding campaign increase crowd participation? [J].
Block, Joern ;
Hornuf, Lars ;
Moritz, Alexandra .
SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS, 2018, 50 (01) :3-27