Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

被引：1

作者：

Kojima N. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, University of Freiburg, Freiburg 79085, Platz der Alten Synagoge, KG II

来源：

Annals of Finance | 2009年 / 5卷 / 2期

关键词：

Asymmetric information; Credit contract; Imperfect competition; Lender borrower relationship; Type-dependent reservation utility;

D O I：

10.1007/s10436-008-0104-8

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper studies a duopolistic credit market in which borrowers differ in risk. In our competition game, one lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. We investigate the features of the equilibrium contract and show that the best borrower is indifferent between the dominant and the opponent lenders' contract while the other borrowers prefer that of the dominant lender. Also, repayment and collateral do not depend upon the borrowers' respective project risk. © Springer-Verlag 2008.

引用

页码：175 / 187

页数：12

共 28 条

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