Interagency collaboration and the management of counter-insurgency campaigns against Boko Haram in Nigeria

This paper examines interagency collaboration (IAC) among key security agencies and how this has impacted the counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Interagency collaboration is often perceived as a panacea for dealing with many complex social problems. But there still exists fogginess about the nature, triggers, and what determines results of interagency collaboration. This study focuses on these issues. We employed the complexity theory to argue that organizations are like complex adaptive systems (CAS) that can naturally be drawn to interdependence and connectivity in reaction to a shared problem. Weiss theory helps to explain the determinants as depending on available resources and the capacity of collaborating institutions. We conclude that despite the tendency towards conflict among the Nigerian security agencies, the initial failure of traditional approach of police and military brutality in quelling the insurrection led to a perception of a shared problem by the government and law enforcement agencies. However, resource and weak institutional capacity to mount collaboration largely explained why the counter-insurgency collaboration has not yielded the expected results.