Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience

被引：0
作者：
Fischer J.M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, Riverside
来源：
The Journal of Ethics | 1997年 / 1卷 / 4期
基金：
美国人文基金会;
关键词：
Badness; Death; Deprivation; Epicurus; Experience; Harm;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1009771331402
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Some have argued (following Epicurus) that death cannot be a bad thing for an individual who dies. They contend that nothing can be a bad for an individual unless the individual is able to experience it as bad. I argue against this "Epicurean" view, offering examples of things that an individual cannot experience as bad but are nevertheless bad for the individual. Further, I argue that death is relevantly similar. © 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
引用
收藏
页码：341 / 353
页数：12
相关论文
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