Monetary policy and asset prices: When cleaning up hits the zero lower bound

被引：0
作者：
Berger W. [1 ,2 ]
Kissmer F. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Chair of Macroeconomics, Cottbus University of Technology, Erich-Weinert-Str. 1, Cottbus
[2] GATE Lyon/St. Etienne (CNRS UMR 5824), 93, chemin des Mouilles, B.P.167, Ecully cedex
[3] University of Hagen, Universitätsstr. 11 (TGZ), Hagen
来源：
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics | 2013年 / 149卷 / 3期
关键词：
asset price bust; cleaning-up; E44; E52; E58; monetary policy; pre-emptive tightening; zero lower bound;
D O I：
10.1007/BF03399393
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Recently, convincing evidence has been presented that the recession in the wake of the recent financial crisis resulted primarily from an overly levered housing sector that was forced to deleverage and cut consumption spending when faced with collapsing housing prices. Following this interpretation it is argued that, as opposed to the consensus view on monetary policy in the vicinity of the ZLB, optimal monetary policy may involve an interest rate increase if the ZLB threatens to become a binding constraint in the aftermath of an asset price bust. This result delivers arguments to advocate a— in the previous literature less favored— pre-emptive tightening policy in an asset price boom. © 2013, Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics.
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页码：291 / 312
页数：21
相关论文
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