Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics

被引:0
作者
Emer O’Hagan
机构
[1] University of Saskatchewan,
来源
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice | 2009年 / 12卷
关键词
Self-knowledge; Kant; Self-deception; Duty; Casuistry;
D O I
暂无
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摘要
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics.
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页码:525 / 537
页数:12
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[1]  
Boyle M(2009)Two kinds of self-knowledge Philos Phenomenol Res LXXVIII 133-164