The effect of term limits on patterns of interest group contributions in state legislatures, 2006-2010

被引：0

作者：

Norberg J. ^{[1
]}

Newton N. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, 113 Professional Building, Columbia, 65211, MO

来源：

Interest Groups & Advocacy | 2015年 / 4卷 / 3期

关键词：

Electoral contributions; Interest groups; State legislatures; Term limits;

D O I：

10.1057/iga.2015.6

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

What is the effect of state legislative term limits on interest group contribution decisions? Although much literature examines interest group behavior, and a separate literature examines the effect of term limits on state legislatures, to date little work has been done to bring these literatures together. In this article, we test the theory that interest groups view contributions as long-term investments in legislators. Snyder (1992) finds this effect in the US Congress, and in this article we test this argument in a new institutional setting. We find that interest groups use term limits as a cue to decrease their investment in legislators who get termed out of office and that this effect is as strong as or stronger than increasing the competitiveness of the election. © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

引用

页码：283 / 296

页数：13