Implications of smart decision-making and heuristics for production theory and material welfare

被引:0
作者
Altman M. [1 ]
机构
[1] University of Dundee School of Business, University of Dundee, Dundee
关键词
Agency; Bounded rationality; Decision-making; Effort variability; Fast and frugal heuristics; Satisficing; x-efficiency;
D O I
10.1007/s11299-019-00219-y
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Conventional theory assumes that economic agents perform at optimal levels of efficiency by definition and this is achieved when individuals behave in a particular fashion. Moreover, neoclassical production theory masks the process by which optimal output can be achieved. I argue that economic theory should be revised to incorporate some key findings of behavioural economics, while retaining the conventional theory’s normative ideal of optimum output whilst rejecting its normative procedural ideals of how to achieve optimality in production. I argue that neoclassical procedures can be expected to yield sub-optimal levels of output and therefore should not be benchmarks for procedural rationality. I present an alternative more realistic and analytically precise specification of the production function related to the fast and frugal heuristics narrative pioneered by Gigerenzer and Leibenstein’s x-efficient theory. This approach incorporates an understanding of the appropriate procedures, psychological and organization variables, decision-making capabilities and end-goals required to achieve optimality in production and, thereby, grow the wealth of nations, thereby enhancing the material wellbeing of the population at large. This also provides us with the tools to better identify economic inefficiency and the conditions that contribute to it. © 2019, The Author(s).
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页码:167 / 179
页数:12
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