Family firms, debtholder-shareholder agency costs and the use of covenants in private debt

被引：11

作者：

Bagnoli M. ^{[1
]}

Liu H.-T. ^{[1
]}

Watts S.G. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette

来源：

Annals of Finance | 2011年 / 7卷 / 4期

关键词：

Agency costs; Dealscan; Debt covenants; Family firms; Private debt;

D O I：

10.1007/s10436-009-0127-9

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We ask whether the private debt contracts of family firms contain more restrictive covenants tied to accounting numbers than those of non-family firms. Our examination of Dealscan data indicates that credit agreements of Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 family firms are more likely to include accounting-based covenants that limit the lender(s)' risk that managers will divert cash or assets to shareholders than those of S&P 500 non-family firms. The likelihood is further increased by presence of a dual class stock system that includes supervoting shares. Our results suggest that lenders are more willing to rely on accounting-based covenants to solve the shareholder-private lender agency problem in family firms given that the reporting quality is higher due to better alignment of owner and manager interests in such firms. © 2009 Springer-Verlag.

引用

页码：477 / 509

页数：32

共 49 条

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