What is a definition?

被引：0
作者：
Brown J.R. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
来源：
Foundations of Science | 1998年 / 3卷 / 1期
关键词：
Definition; Diagram; Hilbert-Frege debate; Lakatos; Notation; Proof;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1009690306330
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
According to the standard view of definition, all defined terms are mere stipulations, based on a small set of primitive terms. After a brief review of the Hilbert-Frege debate, this paper goes on to challenge the standard view in a number of ways. Examples from graph theory, for example, suggest that some key definitions stem from the way graphs are presented diagramatically and do not fit the standard view. Lakatos's account is also discussed, since he provides further examples that suggest many definitions are much more than mere convenient abbreviations.
引用
收藏
页码：111 / 132
页数：21
相关论文
共 21 条
[1]  
Apostoli P., Logic, Truth, and Number. The Elementary Genesis of Arithmetic, Alonzo Church Memorial Volume
[2]  
Bollobs B., Graph Theory, (1979)
[3]  
Cantor G., Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, (1895)
[4]  
Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics, (1995)
[5]  
Dummett M., Frege's Distinction between Meaning and Reference, (1978)
[6]  
Dummett M., Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, (1991)
[7]  
From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics, (1996)
[8]  
Frege G., Foundations of Arithmetic, (1884)
[9]  
Frege G., On Sense and Reference, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, (1892)
[10]  
Frege G., The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, (1918)
123