False contradiction: a critique of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental dialectic in the Kantian thought of Valentin Asmus

Valentin Asmus made a significant contribution to the formation of key interpretations, analyses and evaluations of Immanuel Kant’s work in the Russian-Soviet tradition of studying the “history of foreign philosophy”. This article shows precisely which principles and developmental models Asmus laid down in his interpretation of the transcendental dialectic section of Kant’s philosophical system. The article attempts to show that in his reading of Kant, Asmus actively relies on Hegel’s philosophical legacy, namely, on his theory of dialectics, the ontological status of contradiction and the highly significant role of “error” in the formation and advancement of knowledge. Asmus reads Kant through the lens of Hegel’s philosophy and adheres to Hegelian philosophy as a benchmark of fidelity and heuristics, as a canon and organon, through which Kant’s thought should be evaluated. Pursuing this path, he notes the significant progress of Kant’s thought compared to the metaphysical philosophy of previous centuries, but points out the insufficiency of Kant’s determination to fully think through contradictions ontologically and dialectically. Kant confines himself to pointing out the natural origin of the principle of “appearance” in the limits of reason, but is not ready to revise the foundations of classical logic, where any contradictions should be avoided. As a consequence, he settles on the epistemological interpretation of contradiction seeing it as an error of reason, albeit a natural one, leaving Asmus deeply disenchanted with his Hegelian expectations.