Bilevel competitive facility location and pricing problems

被引:0
作者
A. A. Panin
M. G. Pashchenko
A. V. Plyasunov
机构
[1] Russian Academy of Sciences,Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Siberian Branch
[2] Novosibirsk State University,undefined
来源
Automation and Remote Control | 2014年 / 75卷
关键词
Remote Control; Facility Location; Price Problem; Stackelberg Game; Monopoly Price;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We propose new models for competitive facility location and pricing as bilevel Boolean linear programming problems. We obtain results that characterize the complexity of the problem where a monopolist’s profit on each of the markets is defined with a monotone nonincreasing function of the servicing cost. For this problem, we also propose two approximate algorithms based on the ideas of alternating heuristics and local search. We give results of a computational experiment that show a possibility for fast computation of approximate solutions.
引用
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页码:715 / 727
页数:12
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