Weak and strong luck egalitarianism

Luck egalitarian theories of justice are frequently criticised for being unduly harsh on people who experience disadvantage as a result of their responsible choices. According to the ‘abandonment objection’, luck egalitarians are committed to abandoning even very severely disadvantaged persons as long as responsibility figures in the right way in the genesis of their disadvantage. This article makes a distinction between two views that are insufficiently distinguished in the literature. Weak luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires us to cater to the claims of victims of bad brute luck before there is an obligation to assist responsible victims. Strong luck egalitarianism is the view that responsibility robustly determines the requirements of justice. The abandonment objection presumably targets the less plausible strong view. It does not seem to touch the more plausible weak view. The article consequently argues that the abandonment objection is either trivial or wrong.