Isomorphic effect and organizational bribery in transitional China

Drawing from neo-institutional theory in the organizational field, this article examines the effect of organizational isomorphism in bribery behavior among firms in transitional China. The results show a positive but insignificant relationship between market competition and a given firm’s bribery, indicating that only a weakly competitive isomorphism effect exists in organizational bribery and market competition does not contribute significantly. Moreover, a given firm’s bribery is found to be associated with government intervention positively and significantly, but with government efficiency negatively and insignificantly. It suggests that whether a coercive isomorphism effect exists or not depends on the variable(s) used to measure it, and that government intervention in economic activities can be regarded as a source of firm bribery. Finally, a positive and significant relationship is found between one firm’s and other firms’ bribery, indicating that mimetic isomorphism effects do exist: one firm’s bribery, to some extent, is motivated by other firms’ bribery.