The Revenue-Sharing Rule for Interconnection Charges

被引：0

作者：

Jeong-Yoo Kim

Yoonsung Lim

机构：

[1] Kyung Hee University,

[2] Dongduk Women’s University,undefined

来源：

The Japanese Economic Review | 2004年 / 55卷

关键词：

L11;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper we explore the economic principle behind the revenue-sharing rule for interconnection charges. Our main finding is that symmetric firms can collude by splitting the revenues equally. We further characterize the optimal revenue-sharing ratio and discuss the relationship between optimal ratio and the optimal access price. We also show that the revenue-sharing rule can have the perverse effect of inducing a firm to raise its own costs in order to gain a higher share of revenues.

引用

页码：298 / 310

页数：12

共 18 条

[1]

Armstrong M(1998)Network Interconnection in Telecommunications Economic Journal 108 545-564

[2]

Carter M(1999)Interconnection in Network Industries Review of Industrial Organization 14 1-25

[3]

Wright J(1998)Market Structure in Mobile Telecoms: Qualified Indirect Access and the Receiver Pays Principle Information Economics and Policy 10 471-488

[4]

Doyle C(1982)Moral Hazard in Teams Bell Journal of Economics 13 324-340

[5]

Smith J(2001)An Economic Analysis of the Receiver Pays Principle Information Economics and Policy 13 231-260

[6]

Holmström B(2002)Dutch Treat Versus Oriental Treat Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48 413-422

[7]

Kim J-Y(1998)Network Competition, I. Overview and Non-discriminatory Pricing Rand Journal of Economics 29 1-37

[8]

Lim Y(1998)Network Competition, II. Price Discrimination Rand Journal of Economics 29 38-56

[9]

Kim J-Y(1974)A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 16-37

[10]

Bae H(undefined)undefined undefined undefined undefined-undefined

← 1 2 →