Empirically Investigating the Concept of Lying

被引：11

作者：

Wiegmann A. ^{[1
]}

Rutschmann R. ^{[1
,2
]}

Willemsen P. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] University of Goettingen, Goettingen

[2] University of Potsdam, Potsdam

[3] Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum

来源：

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research | 2017年 / 34卷 / 3期

关键词：

Concept of lying; Definition of lying; Experimental philosophy; Lying;

D O I：

10.1007/s40961-017-0112-z

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Lying is an everyday moral phenomenon about which philosophers have written a lot. Not only the moral status of lying has been intensively discussed but also what it means to lie in the first place. Perhaps the most important criterion for an adequate definition of lying is that it fits with people’s understanding and use of this concept. In this light, it comes as a surprise that researchers only recently started to empirically investigate the folk concept of lying. In this paper, we describe three experimental studies which address the following questions: Does a statement need to be objectively false in order to constitute lying? Does lying necessarily include the intention to deceive? Can one lie by omitting relevant facts? © 2017, ICPR.

引用

页码：591 / 609

页数：18

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