Explaining the European Parliament's gains in the EU Constitution

被引：0

作者：

Benedetto G. ^{[1
]}

Hix S. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham

[2] London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, Houghton Street

来源：

The Review of International Organizations | 2007年 / 2卷 / 2期

关键词：

Delegation; Democratic deficit; EU Constitution; European Parliament;

D O I：

10.1007/s11558-007-9019-9

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The Constitutional Treaty, like each set of reforms since the Single European Act, would constitute another incremental increase in the European Parliament's powers. But the Parliament did not get everything it wanted. What we do in this paper is investigate why the European Parliament tends to 'win' in some areas but not in others. We consider five possible explanations and test these theories by looking at the issues the Parliament promoted in the constitutional negotiations and the factors that determined whether the Parliament was successful or not in a particular area. We find that the Parliament gains power in areas where the governments delegate new powers to the EU and are uncertain about the consequences of this delegation. We also find that public support for the Parliament played a role in the extension of the Parliament's powers in the Constitution. © Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007.

引用

页码：115 / 129

页数：14

共 15 条

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