On-site determination of nerve and mustard gases using a field-portable gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer

被引：6

作者：

Sekiguchi H. ^{[1
,4
]}

Matsushita K. ^{[1
,4
]}

Yamashiro S. ^{[1
,4
]}

Sano Y. ^{[1
,4
]}

Seto Y. ^{[1
]}

Okuda T. ^{[2
]}

Sato A. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] National Research Institute of Police Science, Kashiwa, Chiba 277-0882

[2] Inficon Co., Ltd., Yokohama

[3] Teikoku Sen-i Co., Ltd., Tokyo

[4] Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, Tokyo

来源：

Forensic Toxicology | 2006年 / 24卷 / 1期

关键词：

Air monitoring; Chemical warfare agents; Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry; Mustard gas; Nerve gas; On-site detection;

D O I：

10.1007/s11419-006-0004-4

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A field-portable gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer (the Hapsite system) was evaluated for onsite determination of nerve gases and blistering agents. The analytical sequence involved gas sampling for 1 min, microtrap concentration (1 min), apolar capillary gas chromatographic separation (10 min), electron ionization, quadrupole mass spectrometric data acquisition, and personal computer-based data analysis. Vapor containing 1mg/m3 sarin (GB), 1mg/m3 soman (GD), 3mg/m3 tabun (GA), and 0.5mg/m 3 mustard gas (HD) was analyzed using the Hapsite system. The chemical warfare agents (CWAs) were detected within 10 min, and identified from their respective mass spectra according to the built-in NIST library database. Being based on the signal levels of the CWA peaks observed in mass chromatograms for m/z 99 (GB), 126 (GD), 70 (GA), and 109 (HD), the detection limits (S/N = 3) were estimated to be 0.2, 0.5, 8, and 0.3μg/m3, respectively. A carryover phenomenon was observed after injecting actual CWA samples, necessitating several blank-air purges of the system. The extent of adsorption was in the order: HD > GA > GD > GB. © Japanese Association of Forensic Toxicology and Springer-Verlag 2006.

引用

页码：17 / 22

页数：5

共 17 条

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