Customer equilibrium in a single-server system with virtual and system queues
被引:0
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作者:
Roei Engel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Tel Aviv University,Department of Statistics and Operations Research
Roei Engel
Refael Hassin
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Tel Aviv University,Department of Statistics and Operations Research
Refael Hassin
机构:
[1] Tel Aviv University,Department of Statistics and Operations Research
来源:
Queueing Systems
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2017年
/
87卷
关键词:
Virtual queues;
Equilibrium behavior in a queueing system;
Observable queues;
60K25;
90B22;
68M20;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
学科分类号:
摘要:
Consider a non-preemptive M/M/1 system with two first-come first-served queues, virtual (VQ) and system (SQ). An arriving customer who finds the server busy decides which queue to join. Customers in the SQ have non-preemptive priority over those in the VQ, but waiting in the SQ is more costly. We study two information models of the system. In the unobservable model, customers are notified only whether the server is busy, and in the observable model they are also informed about the number of customers currently waiting in the SQ. We characterize the Nash equilibrium of joining strategies in the two models and demonstrate a surprising similarity of the solutions.