Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders

被引：0

作者：

Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

机构：

[1] Daito Bunka University,Faculty of Economics

来源：

International Journal of Game Theory | 2020年 / 49卷

关键词：

First-price auctions; Uncertain number of bidders; Signaling games; Reserve price signaling;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We study first-price auctions in which the number of bidders is the seller’s private information, and investigate the use of a reserve price to signal this private information. We use the D1 criterion to refine the set of equilibria and characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium outcome, where the reserve price increases with the number of bidders. The key driving force is a certain form of single-crossing property. With more bidders, the seller can afford a high reserve price that discourages competition in the auction, for the winning bid is more likely to be higher.

引用

页码：1081 / 1103

页数：22

共 35 条

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