Distributed medium access control with conditionally altruistic users

In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming ‘by rule’ conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic, conditional, altruism term into the net utility. The effects of altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium for the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)-like random-access framework in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput-based costs of networking, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) players. Unlike related work in this area, our objective is not to optimize the performance of the system but to formulate a realistic economic model capturing altruistic motivations. This model can then form the basis for higher-level incentive schemes that will encourage altruistic, instead of selfish, behavior. In a numerical study we consider the cases of identical or diverse players and show interesting relationships between the main parameters of our model and comparisons with other alternatives discussed in the literature.