A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums

被引:0
作者
Nicolas Houy
机构
[1] Ecole Polytechnique,CNRS – Laboratoire d’Econométrie
来源
Theory and Decision | 2009年 / 67卷
关键词
Voting rules; Majority voting rules with Quorums; D71;
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摘要
We give a characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework of May (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952)’s seminal article. According to these voting rules, an alternative is socially chosen if and only if it obtains the relative majority of votes and the total number of voters not abstaining reaches the quorum.
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页码:295 / 301
页数:6
相关论文
共 4 条
[1]  
Côrte Real P.(2004)The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, representation and abstention Social Choice and Welfare 22 349-369
[2]  
Pereira P.(2006)Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules Mathematical Social Sciences 53 111-121
[3]  
Houy N.(1952)A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions Econometrica 20 680-684
[4]  
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