The dependence of truth on being in Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking

被引：0
作者：
Griffith A.M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of William & Mary, 138 James Blair Hall, Williamsburg, 23187, VA
来源：
Asian Journal of Philosophy | / 1卷 / 1期
关键词：
Deflationism; Dependence; Explanation; Jamin Asay; Truth; Truthmaking;
D O I：
10.1007/s44204-021-00007-x
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this commentary piece, I argue that Asay’s accounts of truth and truthmaking in A Theory of Truthmaking give no role to the idea that truth depends on being. In fact, some of the positions taken in the book are in tension with this idea that has been central to truthmaker theory. I consider how three aspects of Asay’s account relate to the idea that truth depends on being. © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
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