A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

被引:1
作者
Jorge Soares
机构
[1] University of Delaware,Department of Economics
来源
Journal of Population Economics | 2006年 / 19卷
关键词
Public education; Voting; General equilibrium; D78; E62; I22;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits, and its impact on factor prices. I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.
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页码:367 / 389
页数:22
相关论文
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