Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments

被引：0
作者：
Oliver Gürtler
机构：
[1] University of Cologne,Department of Economics
来源：
Journal of Economics | 2010年 / 100卷
关键词：
Tournament; Complete collusion; Partial collusion; Homogeneity; Heterogeneity; Repeated game; C73; M51; M52;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In tournaments, only the relative performance of agents is important. Therefore, the agents have an incentive to collude by jointly deviating to low effort levels. Previous papers on collusion have proposed to make the tournament asymmetric to prevent agents from colluding. However, by allowing side payments between the agents and focusing on implicit enforcement of collusion, the current study demonstrates that this is not true. Often, the principal prefers to hire homogeneous agents to make collusions less stable.
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页码：265 / 280
页数：15
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