The individual behaviour in a public goods game

被引：1
作者：
Walid Hichri
机构：
[1] Université d’Aix-Marsielle. Centre de la Charité,GREQUAM
来源：
International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing | 2005年 / 2卷 / 1期
关键词：
Public goods; free-riding; aggregate level; individual behaviour; experiments;
D O I：
10.1007/BF02893251
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Generally, with a standard linear public goods game, one observes at the aggregate level that contributions lay between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and decrease over time with and end-effect. The purpose of this paper is to see whether these general aggregate results remain available at the group and at the individual levels.
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页码：59 / 71
页数：12
相关论文
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