On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

被引：0
作者：
Fabrizio Germano
机构：
[1] Universitat Pompeu Fabra,Departament d’Economia i Empresa
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2006年 / 34卷
关键词：
Non-cooperative games; Classification; Equivalence; Invariance; Experimental games; Geometry of games; C70; C72; C78; C90; C91;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 ×  2 games; larger games are also studied. It is argued that the procedure leads to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of representing, comparing and testing equilibrium concepts.
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页码：561 / 581
页数：20
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