Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief

被引：0
作者：
Nick Hughes
机构：
[1] University College Dublin,
来源：
Erkenntnis | 2019年 / 84卷
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摘要：
I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.
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页码：57 / 75
页数：18
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