Empirical analysis of the assessment of innovation effects in U.S. Merger cases

被引:2
作者
Kern B.R. [1 ]
Dewenter R. [2 ]
Kerber W. [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Business and Economics, Marburg Centre of Institutional Economics, Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg
[2] Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, Hamburg
关键词
Innovation; Innovation markets; Merger policy; US antitrust;
D O I
10.1007/s10842-016-0225-0
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In merger policy it is still an open question how the negative effects of mergers on innovation should be assessed. In this empirical study all mergers that were challenged by the U.S. antitrust agencies FTC and DOJ between 1995 and 2008 were analyzed in regard to the question to what extent and how the agencies assessed the innovation effects of mergers. The study also contributes to the discussion about differences and convergence in the merger assessments of the two agencies FTC and DOJ. Our results show (1) that in one third of all challenged mergers also innovation concerns have been raised (with no significant differences between the agencies). (2) Despite the wide-spread rejection of the “innovation market approach” in the antitrust debate the agencies used more often an innovation-specific assessment approach that includes also innovation in the market definition than the traditional product market concept. (3) Overall, we found both significant similarities and differences as well as some convergence over time in regard to the specifics of the assessment of innovation effects of mergers between both agencies. © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016.
引用
收藏
页码:373 / 402
页数:29
相关论文
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