Effects of competition in first-price auctions

被引：0
作者：
Gino Loyola
机构：
[1] University of Chile,Department of Management Control and Information Systems
来源：
Economic Theory | 2021年 / 71卷
关键词：
Competition; Bidding markets; Conditionally independent affiliated private information model; Affiliated common values; Affiliation effect; First-price auctions; C62; D44; D82; L41;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the effects of industrial concentration on bidding behavior and expected revenues. These effects are studied under the CIAPI model, an affiliated value set-up that nests a variety of valuation and information environments. We formally decompose the revenue effects coming from less competition into five types. The properties of these effects are discussed and conditions for (non)monotonicity of both the equilibrium bid and revenue are stated. Our results suggest that it is more likely that the seller benefits from less competition in markets with more complete valuation and information structures.
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页码：1527 / 1567
页数：40
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