Determinants of monetary penalties for environmental violations

被引:42
作者
Habib, Ahsan [1 ]
Bhuiyan, Md Borhan Uddin [1 ]
机构
[1] Massey Univ, Sch Accountancy, Palmerston North, New Zealand
关键词
environmental violation; monetary penalties; environmental disclosures; green supply chain management; managerial incentives; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; SELF-REGULATION; CEO INCENTIVES; ENFORCEMENT; FIRM;
D O I
10.1002/bse.1947
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This research investigates the likely determinants of monetary penalties for poor environmental performance. We retrieve data from Bloomberg on the monetary penalties imposed on companies in the European Union (EU) found to have performed poorly in corporate social responsibility (CSR), and particularly in the environmental aspects of CSR. Our primary findings reveal that firms with high levels of greenhouse gas and hazardous waste emissions are more likely to receive monetary penalties. On the other hand, firms that invest in green supply chain practices and disclose environment-related matters avoid monetary penalties more. We also find that firms having executive compensation linked with environmental compliance face more monetary penalties. This finding adds a new dimension to the voluminous research on executive compensation that has investigated primarily the effects of cash and stock option-based compensation schemes on pay-performance sensitivities. Copyright (c) 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
引用
收藏
页码:754 / 775
页数:22
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