Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a North-South general equilibrium model

被引:18
作者
Aronsson, Thomas [1 ]
Backlund, Kenneth [1 ]
Sahlen, Linda [1 ]
机构
[1] Umea Univ, Dept Econ, SE-90187 Umea, Sweden
关键词
Climate policy; Technology transfer; Kyoto protocol; General equilibrium; Clean development mechanism; CLIMATE-CHANGE; STRATEGIES; CDM;
D O I
10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.12.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a 'global social planner', since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:292 / 309
页数:18
相关论文
共 29 条
[1]  
Ambec S., 2006, ENERGY STUDIES REV, V14, P42, DOI DOI 10.15173/ESR.V14I2.493
[2]  
Anger N, 2007, CLIM POLICY, V7, P500, DOI 10.1080/14693062.2007.9685673
[3]  
[Anonymous], J ENV DEV, DOI [10.1177/107049659900800303, DOI 10.1177/107049659900800303]
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2007, Climate Change 2007: The Scientific Basis
[5]   Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility [J].
Aronsson, T ;
Blomquist, S .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2003, 87 (12) :2749-2764
[6]  
Aronsson T., 2004, Welfare Measurement in Imperfect Markets
[7]   International environmental policy reforms, tax distortions, and the labor market [J].
Aronsson, Thomas ;
Jonsson, Thomas ;
Sjogren, Tomas .
FINANZARCHIV, 2006, 62 (02) :199-217
[8]  
Austin D., 1999, How Much Sustainable Development Can We Expect from the Clean Development Mechanism?
[9]  
BANURI T., 2000, CLEAN DEV MECH SUSTA
[10]   SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS [J].
BARRETT, S .
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1994, 46 :878-894