CEO option compensation and systemic risk in the banking industry

被引：3

作者：

Kim, Jeong-Bon ^{[1
]}

Li, Li ^{[2
]}

Ma, Mary L. Z. ^{[3
]}

Song, Frank M. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Waterloo, Sch Accounting & Finance, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Int Trade & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] York Univ, Sch Adm Studies, Toronto, ON M3J 2R7, Canada

[4] Univ Hong Kong, Sch Econ & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 23卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

G21; G32; G01; Stock option compensation; CEO risk-taking incentives; systemic risk; banking; EXECUTIVE STOCK-OPTIONS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CROSS-SECTION; AGENCY COSTS; LIQUIDITY; OWNERSHIP; INSURANCE; INFORMATION; MANAGEMENT; CONTAGION;

D O I：

10.1080/16081625.2016.1155250

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We document that CEO risk-taking incentives induced by stock option compensation increase a bank's contribution to systemic distress risk and systemic crash risk through reacting to common risk exposure of the banking industry. We also find that this relation operates through channels of engagement in non-interest income-generating activities and maturity mismatch associated with short-term debt financing. Further analysis reveals that CEO option-based risk-taking incentives increase investments in innovative financial products that form naturally interconnected networks, which increase systemic risk. Finally, we show that market illiquidity and financial crisis accentuate the relation between CEO risk-taking incentives and systemic risk.

引用

页码：131 / 160

页数：30