Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney game

被引:41
作者
Huttegger, Simon M. [1 ]
Zollman, Kevin J. S. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Log & Philosophy Sci, Irvine, CA 92697 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Philosophy, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
关键词
costly signalling; evolutionary dynamics; handicap principle; polymorphic equilibrium; Sir Philip Sidney game; BEGGING BEHAVIOR; RELATIVES; COST;
D O I
10.1098/rspb.2009.2105
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We study the handicap principle in terms of the Sir Philip Sidney game. The handicap principle asserts that cost is required to allow for honest signalling in the face of conflicts of interest. We show that the significance of the handicap principle can be challenged from two new directions. Firstly, both the costly signalling equilibrium and certain states of no communication are stable under the replicator dynamics (i.e. standard evolutionary dynamics); however, the latter states are more likely in cases where honest signalling should apply. Secondly, we prove the existence and stability of polymorphisms where players mix between being honest and being deceptive and where signalling costs can be very low. Neither the polymorphisms nor the states of no communication are evolutionarily stable, but they turn out to be more important for standard evolutionary dynamics than the costly signalling equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:1915 / 1922
页数:8
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