Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models

被引：40

作者：

Laussel, D ^{[1
]}

Le Breton, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Aix Marseille 2, GREQAM, F-13284 Marseille 07, France

来源：

REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

fiscal competition; Nash equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1016/S0166-0462(97)00029-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize the set of Nash equilibria under some specific assumptions for a fiscal competition game as initiated by Wildasin (1988) (Journal of Public Economics, 35, 129-240) where two jurisdictions compete in tax rates. Equilibria are shown to be either unique or to involve a zero net rate of return on capital. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.

引用

页码：283 / 296

页数：14

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