Naive reinforcement learning with endogenous aspirations

被引:69
作者
Börgers, T [1 ]
Sarin, R
机构
[1] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England
[2] Texas A&M Univ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[3] Indian Stat Inst, Delhi, India
[4] Inst Adv Studies, Vienna, Austria
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1468-2354.00090
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article considers a simple model of reinforcement learning. All behavior change derives from the reinforcing or deterring effect of instantaneous payoff experiences. Payoff experiences are reinforcing or deterring depending on whether the payoff exceeds an aspiration level or falls short of it. Over time, the aspiration level is adjusted toward the actually experienced payoffs. This article shows that aspiration level adjustments may improve the decision maker's long-run performance by preventing him or her from feeling dissatisfied with even the best available strategies. However, such movements also lead to persistent deviations from expected payoff maximization by creating "probability matching" effects.
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页码:921 / 950
页数:30
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